The Distributional Effects of
Fundamental Tax Revisions

JANE G. GRAVELLE*

Proposed shifts to consumption taxes, including the fiat tax, valueadded and sales taxes, and direct consumption taxes, would
redistribute the tax burden across incomes, across generations, and
across taxpayers depending on their sources of income. These
effects derive both from the alteration of the rate structure and the
change in the tax base. The fiat rate taxes should shift the tax
burden significantly from high income to middle- and lower- income
families. The shift to a consumption base redistributes the burden
from the young and future generations to the old. The tax burdens
for future high-income classes could fall by half with the fiat tax.
There is, however, a significant amount of uncertainty with these
projected effects, because of the limitations of data and of our
understanding of lifecycle behavior.
INTRODUCTION

Plans for fundamental tax revision range from traditional income tax
revision to a dramatic shift to a retail sales tax as a replacement for
current income taxes. The value-added tax (VAT), the :flat tax, and the
unlimited savings allowance (USA) tax have also been proposed, all
constituting dramatically different tax systems. The :first option, the
VAT, is a sales tax collected at each stage of production. The :flat and

* Senior Specialist in Economic Policy, Congressional Research Service, Library
of Congress. The views in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Congressional Research Service or the Library of Congress.

1419

USA taxes, however, tend to resemble the current income tax in form,
if not in substance.
There is little precedent for many of these plans. Many countries have
a VAT, although typically not in the form proposed in these plans, and
typically not as a substitute for income taxes. Retail sales taxes are
commonly used by the States, although few countries choose a retail
sales tax at the national level, and no retail sales taxes are levied at the
high rates required to replace current U.S. income taxes. A direct
consumption tax is used by no country. And the 1986 Tax Reform Act,
viewed as one of the most sweeping revisions in history, was a modest
proposal compared to current plans.
Virtually all of the tax proposals flatten the rate structure and broaden
the tax base in several ways; most also shift the base to consumption
rather than income, which has the effect of narrowing the aggregate tax
base, and shifting it as well.
The tax revisions were motivated by many reasons, but the two most
common ones are to obtain a simpler tax and to create a tax system
more conducive to private savings. Ironically, the drawbacks in some
cases may be complexity and higher administrative costs. A direct
consumption tax is probably more complicated than an income tax, and
the retail sales tax is thought by many to be incapable of being
administered at high rates, given the difficulty of distinguishing between
final and intermediate sales and the incentive to cheat at a high rate.
The need to engage in a one-time price inflation is a drawback of the
VAT and sales taxes. Any tax reform may be unwelcome to groups
who have benefitted by the previous tax system's favoritism. But one
of the most serious reservations many people have about these tax
revisions is their potential for redistribution of the tax burden, often in
ways that are not desirable or even easily predictable.
The consequences of the fundamental tax revisions for redistribution
of the tax burden are more far-reaching and complex than perhaps any
other proposals in history. These distributional consequences, which are
important in the aggregate, and can be dramatic for any particular
individual, are extremely difficult to trace because they arise from
several different sources. The one most commonly stressed in the
popular debate is the flattening of the rate structure. Indeed, perhaps the
most widely discussed proposal, which has been introduced by
Representative Armey and Senator Shelby, 1 is simply referred to as the
flat tax. Popular discussions of these taxes do not seem to recognize

1.

(1995).
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that the flat tax has other, perhaps equally important, dimensions--primarily that it is a shift from an income tax to a consumption
tax. Even harder to recognize is that, in trying to avoid the serious
problems associated with a major change in the point of collection
arising with a sales tax or VAT, the flat tax has the potential to impose
a confiscatory wealth tax on certain asset holders. Finally, there are
asset price effects that can arise from disequilibrium in markets due to
the reallocation of capital as tax burdens are made more uniform.
Indeed, housing industry associations, concerned about a possible decline
in prices of owner-occupied housing as loss of tax favoritism depresses
demand in the housing market, have been among the critics of some of
these tax reform proposals.
·
Current tools of distributional analysis are not adequate to the task.
We do not possess the ability, in our concept of tax burden distribution
or in the data needed to implement a proper concept, to outline with
much precision what the distributional impacts will be. Rather, they can
only be defined in general terms, and they arise from some fundamental
effects of tax reform proposals. First, most of the tax reform proposals
propose a flatter rate and a broader base, in which itemized deductions
and a number of special tax provisions will be eliminated. In general,
this flatter rate tends to impose lower effective rates at the higher end of
the income scale and, other things being equal, favors those with high
incomes. In addition, the overall tax burden on capital tends to be
reduced, even were the base maintained as an income tax base, because
of the elimination of double taxation of capital income in some
proposals (the flat tax) or lower rates (the USA tax).
·
This Article addresses the distributional effects by isolating various
parts of tax reform, in order to put together as complete a picture as
possible of the distributional consequences. After explaining how the
proposals relate to each other, the first step is to consider the combination of rate-flattening, base-broadening, and corporate tax integration
contained in the flat tax proposal, without considering the full ramifications of the consumption tax. The next section looks at the consequences of the shift to a consumption base. Remaining sections briefly
discuss adjustment costs, behavioral responses, and transition relief. 2

2. Some of the material in this paper, particularly the parts describing the
proposals and how they work and explaining the burden of a consumption tax relative
to an income tax, are taken from Jane G. Gravelle, The Flat Tax and Other Proposals:
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I.

A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSALS

The proposals, beginning with those that differ most from the current
income tax, include the retail sales tax, the value-added tax, the USA
tax, the flat tax, and income tax reform.
1. Retail sales taxes.-Retail sales taxes, now commonly used as
revenue sources by the States, would impose a tax on products at the
final stage of consumption. Senator Lugar has proposed a national sales
tax, as have Representatives Tauzin and Shaefer.
2. Value-added tax.-Value-added tax (VAT), in theory, is the same
as the sales tax, except that it is collected at each stage of production.
It is termed a value-added tax because the tax base for any given firm
is receipts minus purchases from other businesses, or value added. Two
forms of VAT are commonly discussed: The European style creditinvoice VAT, where firms pay the tax and take a credit for tax on
purchases, and a subtraction-method VAT (also sometimes referred to as
a business transfer tax), where the cost of purchases from other
businesses is deducted from the base before applying the tax. This latter
form of VAT has been proposed by Representative Gibbons; such a
VAT was also proposed in the previous Congress by Senators Boren and
Danforth.
·
3. USA tax.-Also under discussion is the proposal of Senators Nunn,
Domenici, and Kerrey for a combined direct consumption tax (with
graduated rates) on individuals and a VAT on firms, called the USA tax
(for unlimited savings allowance). 3 The direct consumption tax imposes
the tax on income used by individuals for consumption purposes, rather
than on the products. The USA tax is modified in a number of ways,
however, through a series of transition rules that allow firms and
individuals to recover the basis of existing assets in some cases, and by
other rules that cause the proposal to differ substantially from a pure
consumption tax.· The USA tax substitutes for both the income tax and
the employer's share of the payroll tax.
4. Flat tax.-The flat tax proposal advanced by Representative
Armey4 is perhaps the most visible and widely discussed proposal. It

Who Will Bear the Tax Burden?, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. No. 95-1141 (Nov. 29, 1995),
reprinted in 69 TAX NOTES 1517 ( 1995). That paper contains mathematical proofs of
several statements made in this paper regarding the burden of a consumption tax on asset
values.
3. S. 722, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
4. H.R. 2060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). See also S. 1050, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995) (introduced by Senator Shelby); S. 488, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(introduced by Senator Specter).
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was also advanced by former presidential contender Steve Forbes. The
flat tax would be imposed on wage income of individuals and in the
form of a modified VAT on firms, where wages would be deducted from
the base. Thus, the firm tax would be imposed on business receipts
minus purchases, including capital and intermediate goods, and wages
paid. The basic idea for this type of tax was developed by Robert Hall
and Alvin Rabushka, 5 so the tax is sometimes referred to as the HallRabushka tax. There is an exemption from the wage portion, which
results in a progressive tax (effective tax rates rise with income).
5. Tax reform.-Finally, Representative Gephardt has proposed a
significant revision of the current income tax, through broadening the
base-and lowering the rates, while maintaining graduated rates.
IL

THE TAX BASE

Taxes can be imposed on different bases--in particular, on income, on
consumption, or on wages. Taxes may also be flat or graduated. They
may be imposed either on products (to be paid by firms), on firms, or
on individuals. All these aspects of a tax revision may have some
implications for who bears the burden of the tax (for example, via wage
income, assets, or capital income) and therefore the distribution of tax
changes.·
In some cases the nature of the tax being proposed is not transparent,
and in all cases the way in which different types of taxes shift the tax
burden. may not be clear.
The retail sales tax and VAT proposals, as well as the USA tax, are
referred to as consumption taxes and have been advanced as consump~
tion taxes by their proponents. However, the flat tax (which is often
perceived as an income tax) is also a consumption tax. And the USA
tax is not a pure consumption tax because of a series of special
exceptions and transition rules.
The relationship between a wage tax and an income tax is reasonably
straightforward: Since income consists of wage income and capital
income, an income tax can be transformed into a wage tax merely by
exempting capital income.
The relationship of a consumption
tax-which has to do with uses of income rather than sources of
income--to these tax bases is more difficult to see. For example, a
5.

ROBERT

E.

HALL

& ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995).
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consumption tax can also be described as a tax on wages plus a tax on
old capital. Even if all income were consumed, so that the aggregate tax
bases were identical, there would still be a difference in tax burden
between an income and a consumption tax on particular individuals.
Similarly, even if total consumption equaled total wages, the tax burden
imposed through a consumption tax would be greatly different from that
imposed through a wage tax.
A sales tax on consumption goods (that excludes purchases made by
businesses) is a tax that is clearly imposed on the expenditure of income
(from any source) on consumption. Purchases of capital goods, such as
machinery and buildings, are not taxed.
A VAT performs the same function as a sales tax but collects the tax
in pieces. Under a European-style VAT, the retailer pays tax on gross
sales just as he would under a sales tax, but gets a credit for the tax
associated with purchases from his suppliers. The supplier in tum pays
a tax on his gross sales, again receiving a credit for his supplies. The
supplier's suppliers, in tum, pay a tax, so that essentially the entire cost
of the good is subject to tax. When all the bits of tax paid throughout
the entire chain of production are added up, they are the same as a retail
sales tax. All firms get a credit for the tax on capital purchases as well.
A subtraction-method VAT is the same as a credit-method VAT,
except that rather than paying the tax and getting a credit for intermediate purchases on each purchase invoice, intermediate purchases are
subtracted from the base before the tax is imposed. 6
The USA tax includes a VAT at the firm level, and it also imposes a
direct tax on consumption at the individual level by taxing all income,
but deducting savings from the base. The flat tax imposes a tax on
wages for individuals, and a VAT with wages deductible for firms.
The relationship between income, wage, and consumption taxes can
be seen with a couple of simple equalities in the economy, which can be
used to demonstrate the nature of these taxes. First, equate the income
and expenditure sides of the economy as follows:

6. The principal differences between the two methods is that the credit method
can be easily used to differentiate the tax rates across different types of goods and also
may contribute to better compliance since firms report the purchases that generate
credits. The subtraction method is easier for firms to comply with, especially if an
income tax already exists.
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One can now see why the flat tax is a consumption tax. In the
aggregate, it taxes wages (to individuals) and it taxes capital income
minus investment (or savings)7 through its modified VAT on firms. 8
Also, one can see that the consumption tax base is smaller than the
income base (typically about ninety percent) and that the wage tax base
is smaller than both if capital income is larger than investment (typically
wages are about seventy-five percent of income).
·
It should be noted that this splitting and collecting of the tax in pieces
causes the tax not to look like a consumption tax to any particular
taxpayer. To the individual who has passive investments in stocks and
bonds, the flat tax looks like a tax on wages, and to firms it looks more
like a tax on income than a VAT, because wages · are deducted.
Nevertheless, if firms act rationally in making their investment decisions,

7. In this discussion, we use savings and investment interchangeably. In an open
economy, national savings can differ from domestic investment, but this point is not
important to the explanation of the consumption tax base. Note also that we consider
only the major features of the flat tax; for example, fringe benefits other than pensions
are taxed at the firm level, rather than the individual level, so that some portion of
compensation is actually taxed to firms.
8. The modified VAT is gross receipts minus wages minus purchases, including
capital goods investments, which is capital income minus savings. ·
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the equivalent of consumption taxation will be accomplished for each
individual if there were only equity claims to capital. 9
In the actual implementation of the Armey-Shelby flat tax proposal,
part of labor compensation is taxed to the :firm: Non-pension fringe
benefits (primarily health benefits) and the employer's share of the
payroll tax, which is now currently deducted.
The USA tax is slightly more complicated, because it imposes two
consumption-based taxes. The corporate tax is replaced by an eleven
percent VAT, and the individual income tax is replaced by a direct
consumption tax. Thus, there is actually a double consumption tax on
corporate goods. This double tax is partly offset at the corporate level
by allowing a credit against the employer's share of payroll taxes (now
set at 7.65 percent for most employees), so that the corporate VAT is
really like a 3.35 percent VAT and a 7 .65 percent modified VAT similar
to the flat tax approach (imposed on the return to capital minus
investment). Alternatively, one could say that there is an eleven percent
VAT for corporate production and a 7.65 percent wage tax imposed on
noncorporate business, in addition to the direct consumption tax imposed
at the individual level. Either way, some differential will be introduced
between consumption goods produced by the corporate and the
noncorporate sector, but it will be smaller than eleven percent.
Aside from this issue, however, the USA tax actually has a smaller
base than a consumption tax base because it allows the value of assets
existing at the time the tax is imposed to be deducted from the tax base
when converted into consumption. That makes the base fall below the
consumption tax base. That effect shifts the tax burden in important
ways, as described subsequently.
Before turning to that issue, however, it may be useful to explain how
the current income tax can be transformed into the various types of
taxes.
III.

LINKS BETWEEN THE TAX BASES

It may also be helpful to identify exactly how it is that a tax becomes
a consumption tax, and how that condition can be distinguished from the
rate structure or the point of imposition, or even general reforms of the
income tax base. One can link the tax bases moving from an income tax
base to a sales tax with the following illustration, which shows the

9. As explained later, this conclusion must be modified if there is debt and
individuals do not hold equal shares of equity and debt claims, since the burden on debt
is shifted to equity when there is no price accommodation to the tax change.
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progression from the current income tax to the flat tax, the VAT, and the
retail sales tax.
1. From the current income tax to a more broad-based tax.-If we
introduced further reforms in the tax base (eliminating most itemized
deductions, and so forth), we would have a broad-based income tax.
The Gephardt proposal contains revisions along these lines.
2. From the corporate and individual income tax to a single-level
income tax.-If we took the current income tax and eliminated taxation
of interest, dividends, and capital gains at the individual level, while at
the same time disallowing the deductibility of interest, we would have
a proposal for corporate tax integration similar to the comprehensive
business income tax (CBIT), which was discussed in a Treasury study
in 1992. 10 Such a tax would be a single-level income tax, with capital
income taxed at the firm level and wage income at the individual level.
Graduated rates and exemptions would still be applied to the wage base;
capital income could be taxed at the top individual rate or at some other
rate.
3. From a single-level income tax to a flat income tax.-If we
imposed flat rates, allowing only a flat exemption for individual returns,
we would have a flat income tax, with an exemption.
4. From the flat income tax to the flat (consumption) tax.-If we now
eliminated depreciation and deductions for inventories currently held
when sold, but allowed the deduction of acquisitions of capital assets
and purchase of inventories, we would transform the flat income tax into
a flat (consumption) tax like the current proposed flat tax.
5. From the flat tax to the VAT.-If we eliminated the tax on wages
at the individual level and added wages to the business tax base, we
would have a subtraction method VAT. (That would, of course, require
sacrificing the individual exemption.)
6. From the VAT to the retail sales tax.-If we eliminated the tax on
all firms producing intermediate goods and simply imposed it at the final
point of retail sale, without a deduction for purchases, we would have
a retail sales tax on consumption.
Note that this taxonomy does not include all potential taxes. If we
skipped the firm-level tax altogether in the flat tax proposal, we would
have a tax on wages. If we taxed capital income at the individual level
10. INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS, U.S. DEP'T
OF TREASURY (1992).
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(which would include taxing shareholders on their share of corporate
earnings), we would have one level of tax at the individual level. If we
then allowed the inclusion of sales of assets and loans and the deduction
of purchases of assets and repayment of loans, we would have a direct
consumption tax.
The USA tax combines a VAT on firms with a direct consumption tax
on individuals, which is substituted for the income tax and part of the
payroll tax. It thus skips the corporate integration step, thereby
imposing a potential double tax on consumption-once at the individual
level and once at the firm level. However, it offsets the taxes on old
capital at both levels by allowing tax-free recovery of capital, moving in
the direction of a wage tax.
To some extent, the choices of tax base, flat or graduated rate, and
point of collection are independent. There is an exception: Indirect taxes
like the VAT and sales taxes cannot incorporate graduated rates. Aside
from that exception, however, individual taxes or firm-level taxes can be
imposed on any of the bases.
To assess the distributional effects of these tax revisions, we consider
the taxes in stages. The following section examines the distributional
effects that arise from the rate and base changes, assuming the tax is still
on an income base, that is, it largely encompasses steps (1) through
(3).11
The next section examines how the movement to a consumption tax
(step 4) is likely to affect the results, and in tum how the movement to
a VAT or retail sales tax would likely alter the burden distribution.
Other sections consider some of the potential responses that arise from
the evening-out of tax rates on different types of capital and transition
rules.
IV.

DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF A FLAT RATE, BROAD-BASED
INCOME TAX

The Treasury Department's Office of Tax Analysis 12 provided some
analysis of the distribution across income levels of the Armey-Shelby
flat tax proposal. This proposal would impose a tax rate of seventeen
percent on wages and pension distributions at the individual level,
allowing a standard deduction ($10,700 for single filers, $21,400 for

11. No data are available for the USA tax, which has graduated rates and is
designed to be distributionally neutral, or for the Gephardt tax, which also would be
planned to maintain current progressivity.
12. See Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of Treasury, New Armey-Shelby
Flat Tax Would Still Lose Money, Treasury Finds, 70 TAX NOTES 260 (1996).
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joint filers, and $14,000 for head-of-household filers) and additional
personal exemptions of $5,000 for each dependent. There would also be
a cash flow tax on businesses, levied on gross receipts less purchases of
intermediate and capital goods and wages (including pension contributions). Non-pension fringe benefits (such as health insurance) and
employer contributions to social security would not be deductible. As
noted above, this approach is like a VAT with the wage portion (and
pension distributions) split off and taxed to individuals. One can also
think of the business tax in two parts: A tax on employee compensation
in the form of fringe benefits and payroll taxes, and a tax on cash flow
that is like a tax on business income, except that cash fl.ow accounting
is used and interest is neither taxed nor deducted.
Treasury's analysis assigned the burden of the firm-level tax (excluding the compensation portion) as if it were an income tax rather than a
consumption tax, allocating it to capital income in general. Thus, their
analysis shows us how the features of rate-flattening, base-broadening,
and corporate tax integration combine to shift the tax burden. Of course,
because the flat tax is actually imposed on a consumption base, the
capital income tax rate is lower than the statutory rate, by at least thirty
percent. 13 The Treasury found the Armey-Shelby plan to yield
inadequate revenues at the proposed levels of wage exemptions and
rates. Thus, they prepared two simulations: One that raised the rate to
20.8 percent to be revenue neutral, and a second that maintained the
seventeen percent rate and reduced the deductions and exclusions. In
this latter calculation, the standard deduction is reduced to $10,200
(joint) and $5,100 (single), and dependent exemptions are reduced to
$2,400. These two alternatives illustrate how the trade-off between
flatter rates and larger exemptions works. The Treasury study also
provides two different types of distributions: One by dollar levels of
income, and one by population shares. The former provides more

13. The base of the income tax is RK, where R is the rate of return and K is the
capital stock. Consumption minus wages is (R-g)K, where g is the rate of growth in the
capital stock (gK is savings). Assuming that the overall capital income tax is 30%, but
that owner-occupied housing, which accounts for about 30% of the stock, is taxed at a
zero rate, the overall return on business capital is 8%, assuming a 5% after-tax real
return. If the growth rate is 2.5%, then savings is slightly over 30% of the return. See
JANE G. GRAVELLE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 294, 300
{1994), for data on tax rates and capital shares. Returns on government securities are
also not taxed.
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disaggregation at the lower income levels, while the latter provides more
detail at higher income levels. The income concept adopted in the
following tables is a very broad one, corresponding closely to an
economist's concept of income; it is much broader than adjusted gross
income. 14
Table 1 (following page) shows the Treasury data, rearranged in the
form of effective tax rates and distributed by income levels, for current
and proposed law. Both totals, and income taxes, are reported separately.15 The, second column shows, for each income class listed in the
first column, other taxes (primarily payroll taxes). These taxes are
roughly proportional through much of the income range, falling at the
top levels. Current law income taxes are, by contrast, quite progressive,
with negative tax rates at the lower end. Added together, these taxes
result in a total tax structure that is progressive, although only mildly so
in the higher brackets.
Table 2 (following Table 1) provides detail by population share,
showing that the same pattern persists up to the very highest income
levels. While the new flat tax is still progressive in general, it is much
less so than the current income tax system. Tax rates at the lower
income levels become positive rather than negative, and as one might
expect, effective tax rates begin to flatten out towards the high end and
actually fall at the highest income levels. · Total taxes, formerly
progressive, are now characterized by a slight hump: Highest in the
middle, with lower rates . for lower- and higher-income individuals.
Lower rates at the low end reflect the results of exemptions. Lower
rates at the high end reflect two features of the tax that cause rates to
decline: The inclusion of employer payroll taxes in the business tax,
which has no exemption and tends to decline relative to income because
of the ceiling on earnings subject to the payroll tax, and the exclusion
of a lower effective rate on capital income.

14. Family income is combined; unreported income, transfer payments, fringe
benefits, accruals of capital income not currently reported or excluded (including capital
gains), are added back; and adjustments for inflation and accelerated depreciation are
made.
·
·
, ·
15. Current law estate and gift taxes are excluded from the table, hence the small
overall net reduction in the table for this revenue-neutral plan.
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TABLE 1: EFFECTIVE TAX RATES, REPLACING INCOME AND
ESTATE TAXES WITH A 20.8% FLAT TAX, BY INCOME CLASS

Income
Class($
thousands)

Current
Law
Other
Taxes(%)

Current
Law
Income
Taxes(%)

Current
Law
Total
Taxes(%)

New
Law
Flat
Taxes(%)

New
Law
Total
Taxes(%)

0 - IO

10.2

-2.1

8.1

3.5

13.8

IO - 20

10.2

-1.4

8.8

4.8

15.0

20 - 30

10.4

3.0

13.4

7.2

17.6

30 - 50

JO.I

7.2

17.3

9.5

19.6

50 - 75

10.6

9.2

19.8

11.1

21.8

75 - JOO

10.7

10.5

21.2

12.7

23.4

JOO - 200

8.8

13.1

21.9

14.2

23.0

200 +

3.0

20.7

23.6

14.0

17.0

Total

9.4

11.4

20.8

11.8

21.2

SOURCE: DERIVED FROM TREASURY DEPARTMENT (1996) DATA:
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TABLE 2: EFFECTIVE TAX RATES, REPLACING INCOME AND ESTATE
TAXES WITH A 20.8% FLAT TAX, BY INCOME QUINTILE
Income
Quintile

Current
Law Other
Taxes(%)

Current
Law
Income
Taxes(%)

Current
Law Total
Taxes(%)

New
Law Flat
Taxes(%)

New Law
Total
Taxes (%)

First

JO.I

-2.4

7.6

3.7

13.8

Second

10.5

2.0

12.5

6.7

17.3

Third

10.4

7.0

17.5

9.4

19.9

Fourth

10.4

9.3

19.7

11.2

21.6

Highest

6.6

15.5

22.1

13.9

20.5

Total

9.4

11.4

20.8

11.8

19.8

Top 10%

5.8

17.3

23.1

14.1

19.8

Top 5%

4.0

19.1

23.1

14.2

18.2

Top 1%

2.1

22.4

24.1

13.6

15.6

SOURCE: DERIVED FROM TREASURY DEPARTMENT (1996) DATA. QUINTILES BEGIN AT
$15,604, SECOND; $29,717, THIRD; $48,660, FOURTH; $79,056, HIGHEST; $108,704, TOP
10%; $145,412, TOP 5%; AND $349,438, TOP 1%.
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Tables 3 and 4 (following pages) show the results for the lower tax
rate and lower exemption. The very lowest income levels would still
pay about the same tax since they tend to still have most of their income
excluded, and the lower rate makes up for most of the lost exemptions.
Higher taxes tend to be imposed at the more moderate income levels,
where loss of exemptions and deductions are more important than the
lower rate. Somewhere between $75,000 and $100,000, or for the top
twenty percent of the population, the lower rate becomes more important, and tax burdens fall. The shape of the overall tax burden is twisted
further in favor of lower rates at the high levels. The top one percent
of the population pays at lower rates than virtually any group.
As the exemptions become smaller and the tax becomes lower, the
burden shifts away from higher-income individuals, and one can see that
a purely flat tax with no exemptions would be a regressive tax, and
therefore a regressive Federal total tax, since the other remaining taxes
are regressive. The tax could be made more progressive, on the other
hand, by increasing exemptions and raising rates. Choosing a single rate
does, however, constrain the shape of the distribution ..
How does one interpret these changes in distribution? It has been
common for many years for government agencies and _press reports to
express these changes as percentage changes in tax liability. This
approach is misleading for understanding distributional implications,
particularly when applied to taxes that are currently imposed at very low
rates. A fall in tax of one dollar is a 100 percent reduction when the
initial tax is only one dollar, but a change in tax liability of one dollar
is of little import in considering distribution. Thus, a proportional
reduction in taxes, from a system that is already progressive, would
provide a more uneven distribution of disposable income.
The more revealing measure for determining how the income
distribution has changed is the percentage change in after-tax income,
and this measure is now commonly reported along with percentage
change in tax liability by the Treasury Department. If all individuals
have the same percentage change in disposable income, then the shares
of available income have not changed and relative distribution has not
changed.
Tables 5 and 6 (following Table 4) report both of these measures for
each tax rate: Table 5 by income class, and Table 6 by population share.
While there are dramatic changes in tax liability, a more reasonable
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TABLE 3: EFFECTIVE TAX RATES, REPLACING INC<;)ME AND ESTATE
TAXES WITH A 17% FLAT TAX, BY INCOME CLASS

Income
Class ($
thousands)

Current
Law
Income
Taxes(%)

Other
Taxes(%)

Current
Law
Total
Taxes
(%)

New
Law Flat
Taxes
(%)

0 - 10

10.2

-2.1

8.1

3.8

13.9

10 - 20

10.2

-1.4

8.8

6.2

16.5

20 - 30

10.4

3.0

13.4

8.8

19.3

30 - 50

10. 1

7.2

17.3

! I.I

21.5

50 - 75

10. 6

9.2

19.8

12.3

23.0

75 - 100

10. 7

10.5

21.2

13.1

23.4

100 - 200

8.8

13.1

21.9

13.5

21.9

200 +

3.0

20.7

23.6

11.9

14.9

Total

9.4

11.4

20.8

11.8

21.2

SOURCE: DERIVED FROM TREASURY DEPARTMENT (1996) DATA.
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TABLE

4: EFFECTIVE TAX RATES, REPLACING INCOME AND ESTATE TAXES WITH

A 17% FLAT TAX, BY INCOME QUINTILE

Income
Quintile

Other
Taxes(%)

Current
Law
Income
Taxes(%)

Current
Law Total
Taxes(%)

New Law
Flat
Taxes(%)

New Law
Total
Taxes(%)

-2.4

7.6

4.6

14.7

2.0

12.5

8.3

18.7

10.4

7.0

17.5

10.9

21.3

Fourth

10.4

9.3

19.7

12.3

23.1

Highest

6.6

15.5

22.1

12.7

19.9

Total

9.4

11.4

20.8

11.8

19.8

Top 10%

5.8

17.3

23.1

12.6

18.3

Top 5%

4.0

19.1

23.1

12.3

16.3

Top 1%

2.1

22.4

24.1

11.3

13.4

First

10.1

Second

10.5

Third

•

SOURCE: DERIVED FROM TREASURY DEPARTMENT (1996) DATA. QUINTILES BEGIN AT

$15,604, SECOND; $29,717, THIRD; $48,660, FOURTH; $79,056, HIGHEST; $108,704, TOP
10%; $145,412, TOP 5%; AND $349,438, TOP I%.
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TABLE 5: PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN TAXES AND INCOME, REPLACING
INCOME AND ESTATE TAXES WITH A FLAT TAX, BY INCOME CLASS
Income
Class ($
thousands)

Percentage
Change in Tax
Liability
(20.8% rate)

Percentage
Change in
After-tax
Income
(20.8% rate)

Percentage
Change in
Tax Liability
(17% rate)

Percentage
Change in
After-tax
Income
(17% rate)

0 - 10

70.7

-6.2

73.0

-6.4

IO - 20

70.4

-6.8

86.3

-8.4

20 - 30

31.7

-4.9

43.9

-6.8

30 - 50

13.4

-2.8

22.0

-4.7

50 - 75

9.7

-2.4

15.2

-3.8

75 - 100

10.4

-2.8

12.1

-3.2

100 - 200

5.0

-1.4

1.6

-0.4

-28.1

8.7

-37.4

11.5

1.9

-0.5

20.8

11.8

200 +

Total

SOURCE: TREASURY DEPARTMENT (1996).

1436

Fundamental Tax Revisions

[VOL. 33: 1419, 1996]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

TABLE 6: PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN TAXES AND INCOME, REPLACING
INCOME AND ESTATE TAXES WITH A FLAT TAX, BY INCOME CLASS

Income
Quintile

Percentage
Change in Tax
Liability
(20.8% rate)

Percentage
Change in
After-tax
Income
(20.8% rate)

Percentage
Change in
Tax Liability
(17% rate)

Percentage
Change in
After-tax
Income
(17% rate)

First

80.9

-6.7

92.0

-7.6

Second

37.7

-5.4

50.7

-7.2

Third

13.7

-2.9

22.3

-4.7

Fourth

9.8

-2.4

IS.I

-3.8

Highest

-7.4

2.1

-12.0

3.5

1.9

-0.5

1.9

-0.5

Top 10 %

-14.4

4.2

-20.7

6.2

Top 5 %

-21.3

6.4

-29.5

8.9

Top 1%

-36.1

11.7

-45.2

14.7

Total

SOURCE: DERIVED FROM TREASURY DEPARTMENT (1996) DATA. QUINTILES BEGIN AT

$15,604, SECOND; $29,717, THIRD; $48,660, FOURTH; $79,056, HIGHEST; $108,704, TOP
10%; $145,412, TOP 5%; AND $349,438, TOP 1%.
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assessment of distribution effects can be seen by exammmg the
. percentage changes in after-tax income, where it is apparent that all of
these proposals redistribute income from the poor to the rich. The
largest reductions in after-tax income occur in the lower income classes,
although which classes have the largest effects depends on the choice of
tax rate and exclusion. ·
These changes would be characterized in some cases as dramatic.
Even with the higher rate and larger exemptions, the top one percent of
the population (Table 6) has its income increased by twelve percent;
with lower tax rates, the increase is fifteen percent.

V.

THE EFFECTS OF SHIFTING TO A CONSUMPTION BASE:
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

A much more challenging issue is posed when one considers the shift
from an income-tax base to a consumption-tax base. Although the
aggregate tax base may look very similar to that of an income-tax base,
the burden of the tax is quite different.
Before considering the quantitative issues, it is important to establish
an understanding of the fundamental shifting and burden measures. of a
consumption tax. To simplify, first consider a direct consumption tax,
such as the individual USA tax.

A.

A Direct Consumption Tax

Essentially, a consumption tax is a tax on wages plus old capital,
including any earnings present or future by the holder of old capital
from the time the tax is imposed until the asset is sold. One can see this
effect by disaggregating the consumption tax base, whose aggregate
relationship obscures another activity that is going on· in the e·conomythe sale and purchase of assets. Given a consumption tax imposed in the
form of, say, a sales tax on consumer goods, we could redefine the
consumption tax base as:
Consumption = Wages + Old Asset Sales - Old Asset Purchases
+ Capital Income - Investment
.This relationship can be used to show why a consumption tax is a tax
on wages plus old capital. Consider a highly simplified illustration of
an economy with only two groups of people, the old and the young. · In
a given period, when the consumption tax is imposed, the old people
own all of the capital initially, which they then use for consumption by
selling the capital to the young (they also consume the capital income).
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Thus, their tax base is old asset sales plus capital income from capital.
The young have only wages, but they save, buying the existing capital
from the old, and, if the economy is growing, also spending some of
their wages on newly manufactured capital goods. They pay a tax on
their wages which are used for consumption, but not on- their wages
which are used for asset purchases. Thus, their part of the tax base is
wages minus old asset purchases, minus investments in newly manufactured assets.
Hence, splitting up the above tax base into two parts:
1. Consumption of the Old = Old Asset Sales + Capital Income
2. ·, Consumption of the Young = Wages ;. Old Asset Purchases Investment
The consumption base can now be seen to include the existing capital
stock. Of course, at the same time, the· wage base of the young is
reduced by purchases of that existing capital stock in addition to new
investment. But the young essentially only pay a tax on wages. They
defer the tax on the part of those wages that is not immediately
consumed, until it is consumed. For example, in this simple model,
when the young become old the next year, their capital assets will be
sold and taxed along with any interest earned, when it is turned into
consumption. The present value of this tax is the same as if the wages
were taxed when earned, so that the effect is the same as wage taxation
for the young, except that part of it is collected (with interest) in the
following year. Another way of thinking about this is that young
individuals pay a tax on their wages, but then they receive a tax benefit
on thetr savings Gust as in the case of an IRA). This tax is repaid with
interest the next year. In present-value terms, they are indifferent
between paying the full tax on wages now and paying part of the tax
now and deferring part and paying it with interest in the next period. 16
This example also illustrates how the tax burden is shifted in moving
from an income tax to a consumption tax. Urider the income tax, the tax
base for the old was much smaller, because only the return to capital
(interest, dividends, etc.) was taxed, and not the return, of capital. Under
a consumption tax both of these are taxed. Moreover,· the tax rate will
. be slightly higher, because the overall tax base is· smaller.

16,

For a mathematical proof, see Gravelle, supra note 2.
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The young have their taxes lowered, however. They are effectively
exempted from any tax on their earnings from savings, and this
exemption is large enough to offset the slightly higher tax rate imposed.
The timing of the exemption of new capital from the tax is crucial in
achieving a smooth flow of tax revenue. If a tax were directly imposed
on wages and old capital, the initial year's tax base would be enormous,
since the capital stock is three to four times the size of the economy, and
thereafter would be much smaller. To offset this effect, the purchases
of this capital by the young are deducted from wages. That is, part of
the tax on wages is deferred until the capital is consumed, producing a
much smaller base, leaving a base that is only slightly smaller than the
wage base, and maintaining a larger base in the future.
Of course, the actual economy is much more complicated, since it has
many generations and only a portion of the capital stock is sold each
year. Other things equal, the young tend to pay a relatively smaller tax
but the burden increases with each generation, until the heaviest tax is
borne by the old. The eventual effect, however, is nevertheless the
same: The consumption tax base is old capital and wages, and consumption taxes do not impose a tax on the rate of return to new investment.
This illustration not only simplifies the generational comparisons, but
also simplifies other matters. Some individuals who might be described
as "lifetime poor" do very little saving; in their case the income tax,
consumption tax, and wage base are virtually identical. How the burden
of the tax shifts depends on how the rates and exemption levels change,
and whether transfer payments are effectively subject to tax. Some
individuals who are extremely wealthy, on the other hand, may pass on
wealth from one generation to another without ever consuming it. Even
though the consumption tax burden would eventually apply when
consumption takes place, such an event may be unlikely to occur.
These illustrations demonstrate why the consumption tax is referred to
by economists as a tax on wages plus old capital. They also suggest that
the concern about transition rules to provide relief to old capital are
inconsistent with the fundamental nature of a consumption tax. A
consumption tax with an exemption of tax on old capital moves the tax
towards a wage tax, and it would be much easier to impose the tax in
that way, as a wage tax. When the USA tax, for example, allows
individuals to recoup basis tax-free or firms to recoup depreciation on
the existing capital stock, it is transforming the consumption tax base
into something quite different-a tax whose consequences vary across
the generations in ways very different from income, consumption, or
wage taxes.
The illustrations made thus far are for a consumption tax imposed
directly on individuals, such as the individual part of the USA tax. This
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tax has two important characteristics: It applies to both financial and
physical assets, and because it continues to tax wages at the individual
level, it does not require any accommodation of the tax in price, as
would likely be the case if the taxes were all collected from businesses,
as in the case of a sales tax.

B.

Indirect Consumption Taxes

Many of the tax proposals being discussed are not of that nature. The
VAT and sales tax approaches impose taxes not on the individual, but
on firms. And these approaches count only sales of, and investments in,
real physical assets in measuring savings, and not financial assets. The
Hall-Rabushka approach, as embodied in the Armey flat tax proposal, is
a modified VAT which imposes a tax on wages at the individual level,
and imposes the remainder of taxes on the firm. A portion of the USA
tax is imposed on firms via a value-added tax. These taxes only
resemble the direct consumption approach if all individuals run their own
businesses and work in them, and even then, only if businesses have no
debt. But most capital is held in the form of financial claims such as
stocks and bonds, and most individuals work for others.
Two points are important to remember in assessing these more
complicated proposals: The form of the tax can matter but the channeling of the tax through an intermediary (a firm) should not matter per se,
except for a possible adjustment period.
In assessing the burden of indirect consumption taxes, it is important
to distinguish between those types of proposals that are likely to require
a general price accommodation and those that are not. A national sales
tax, or a VAT, because it creates a wedge between the prices charged by
the firms and the overall costs of production--and in particular labor
costs-would tend to produce an economic contraction if no price
accommodation is made, due to sticky wages and prices (that is, firms
would find it hard to lower their wages to allow them to pay the tax and
might begin reducing their work force instead).
If prices are allowed to rise to accommodate an indirect consumption
tax levied in the form of a VAT, then the true burden of the tax is
exactly as described in the previous section on direct consumption taxes
(ignoring transfer payments), but is accomplished not through direct tax
payments but through reduced purchasing power. Wages and asset
prices do not fall, but their purchasing power with respect to consump-
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tion goods declines, producing exactly the same result (in terms of real
quantities of goods consumed) as in the direct consumption tax case. 17
If transfer payments are not indexed, they will effectively be taxed by
an indirect tax that leads to price accommodation.
This shifting of the tax burden via price rises can be contrasted with
the Armey flat tax proposal. In general, wage income is taxed directly
in the flat tax (with the exception of fringe benefits), while 'the
remainder of the consumption base (capital income minus net invest~
ment) is taxed at the firm level. Because wages are taxed to individuals
rather than to the firm, there is no reason to accommodate the tax with
a rise in price.
For individuals whose capital is solely invested in their own business-.
es and who have no debt, the results are exactly like a direct consumption tax. A business that is making new investments has a tax base that
includes gross receipts of the firm (reflecting wage income of the owner
plus profits from capital plus sales of assets) minus purchases of assets,
which is a consumption tax base.
However, if the business owner has debt, there is a real difference
between the flat tax and the other forms of tax, arising from the
imposition of a lump sum tax on physical capital, without the resulting
price accommodation, to allow the sharing of that burden with both debt
and equity claims. Indeed, in this way, the flat tax can become a
confiscatory tax.
An illustration may be useful, assuming a twenty percent tax to keep
the math simple. 18 Suppose an individual has a property he sells for
$100,000 net of transaction costs, a loan of $90,000, and a basis of
$95,000. Such a situation might occur for a recently purchased property.
Under the income tax, his capital gain is $5,000, and his net proceeds
after repaying the loan are $10,000, yielding $9,000 after tax. Under a
direct consumption tax, he includes the $100,000 in income but deducts
the $90,000 loan (the creditor includes it in income), for a tax of $2,000

17. The indirect tax rate, if it is imposed on post-tax consumption rather than
pretax resources available for consumption, as in the case of a sales tax, would be
higher. (Prices of investment goods would not rise because they are exempt from the
tax.) For example, if a 20% direct consumption tax is imposed, after-tax consumption
will be only 80% of income after subtracting taxes and savings. A sales tax would have
to be levied at a 25% rate, however, so that the consumer, when purchasing $80 dollars
of goods net of tax would also have to pay a 25% tax ($20/$80) in order to spend $ 100
and maintain the ratio of 80 to .100. Technically, a tax levied on post-tax consumption
would be at a rate equal to v/(1-v), where v is the tax rate on resources available for
consumption.
18. This illustration is also presented in Jane G. Gravelle, Is Fundamental Tax
Reform Possible?,' NTA FORUM (Nat'l Tax Ass'n, Falls Church, VA), Spring 1996, at
1.
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and a net of $8,000. Under the VAT or sales tax, the price of the
property should rise to $125,000 (the VAT rate on the net of tax price
should be twenty-five percent to make it twenty percent of the taxinclusive price). He pays $25,000 in tax and has proceeds, after
repaying the loan, of $10,000. Of course, his purchasing power has now
fallen, since what he can purchase now is only worth $8,000 in real
terms, which is the same in terms of original prices as paying a $2,000
tax. The creditor has also lost purchasing power. But, under the flat
tax, he includes the entire $100,000 in income, o.wes $20,000 in taxes
and, after repaying the $90,000 loan, has a loss of $10,000. The twenty
percent tax has become a 200 percent tax. The creditor pays nothing.
C.

The Flat Tax and the Stock Market

What about corporate capital, where deductions for capital acquisition
will be taken by the firm? For individuals whose equity assets are in
stocks rather than physical assets, the tax does not resemble a tax on
consumption. Looking just at the individual tax, it appears to be a tax
on wages, which means that the young in our stylized example are
actually paying as much or more than the old in income tax because they
have the same tax base with a slightly higher rate. The old appear to be
paying no taxes at all. Nevertheless, the tax that falls on firms must be
paid by some individual--either through capital income, wage income,
or asset prices.
We consider first the effect on corporate equities when there is no
debt, and secondly the overall effect on financial assets when there is
debt. 19
The effect of the Armey flat tax should be a pronounced fall in the
stock market, according to economic theory. In the case where there is
no debt, that fall should reflect the tax rate--if the rate is twenty percent,
the stock market should fall by twenty percent. 20 In fact, such a fall

19. For a mathematical proof, see Gravelle, supra note 2.
20. There is one reservation about this point. Currently, because of accelerated
depreciation and failure to index for inflation, the undepreciated asset balance tends to
fall below market value and that feature itself would produce an asset price fall, reducing
the total fall in the stock market, simply because some discounting has already taken
place. In the case of direct sales of assets, this simply says that basis is smaller than
market value, so that some taxable proceeds of the sale of assets-already exist, and thus
any additional taxable sales will be smaller than the market value of the assets.
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would simply create the same true outcome in terms of real purchasing
power as the case of a VAT or sales tax with price accommodation-the
purchasing power of assets has fallen.
With price accommodation, the burden on old capital occurs because
the same sales price of assets in nominal terms will purchase fewer
goods, because the price of goods has increased. Without price
accommodation, where the price of goods is fixed, the value of assets
must fall.
Note that a fall in the stock market by the rate of the tax will again
produce results identical to those of the direct consumption tax. The old
individual will sell his asset for (1-v) less, while the young individual
will be able to purchase his investments at a discount. As with the
direct tax, this discount must be repaid with interest when he sells the
asset in the next period.
What causes the stock market to fall? The basic reason is that for a
newly manufactured asset (or a new firm), the rate of return on
investment is going up, because the firm's deduction of asset acquisition
costs---which is equivalent to imposing no tax in present-value
terms---renders the return higher. That means that the individual rate of
return, or discount rate, is higher on a new investment than an existing
one. Since the return from old capital in existing corporations is still
subject to the tax, the only way to make the return on the existing
stocks equal to the return on the new investment-and to make the
individual willing to purchase it-is for the stock value to fall by the
amount of the tax. For example, suppose the pretax rate of return is R;
if the cash flow tax rate is v, then the :flow of profits from ownership of
an existing stock that originally represented one dollar of capital is R(lv). But a new asset will earn a return of R because its acquisition cost
can be deducted. If the value of stock falls to (1-v), it will earn the
same rate of return as a new investment.
To present a simple example, suppose the pretax return is ten percent
and the tax rate is twenty percent. A new investment will earn a ten
percent rate of return, but an existing one (where the :flow of capital is
subject to the tax) will earn only eight percent. Suppose a share of stock
sells for $100. After tax, there is an annual return of $8. If the price of
the stock fell to $80, it would now earn a return of ten percent ($8/$80),
making it as attractive an investment as a new $80 investment that will
earn $8, for a rate of return of ten percent. Another way to look at this
is from the perspective of maximization of profits inside the firm. If the
tax rate is twenty percent, then a new asset that costs one dollar to
construct can be purchased for only eighty cents, because of the
immediate deduction of costs. (For both old and new investment, the
:flow of return will be taxed.) If stock can be sold for one dollar, then
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the firm can make twenty cents on the sale. Thus, at the margin, it
would make sense for the firm to keep issuing stock, until the price
drops to eighty cents, where selling a stock share is exactly worth the
value of the investment it purchases.
This analysis suggests, therefore, that the translation of an indirect
consumption tax, such as the Armey tax, into the equivalent of a direct
consumption tax would be accompanied by a dramatic fall in the value
of the stock market. Theoretically, this fall should occur immediately
if the tax change came as a surprise; otherwise, it should begin to occur
in advance of the adoption of the tax.
Of course, there is no way to be sure that this phenomenon will occur
as predicted by theory; in that case, the Armey flat tax becomes a tax
whose incidence, even in a fundamental way, is unknown.
The same sort of price adjustment process would occur for a VAT or
a sales tax where price change was not accommodated. Because these
taxes also impose an indirect tax on wages, wage rates should fall as
well.

D.

Debt and the Effect on the Stock Market

The effect of debt works exactly the way it would in the case of direct
ownership. Part of the financial claims to assets are held in the form of
debt, and these nominal claims cannot fall in value. In this case, the
equity holders must bear the burden of the tax on old capital. In
particular, for each original dollar of value, the asset value will fall by
the full amount of the tax on all capital, even if equity provides only a
fraction of the assets. For example, if the tax rate is twenty percent and
equity constitutes two-thirds of the total asset value, then the value of
equity assets will fall not by twenty percent, but by thirty percent. If
equity constituted one-half of the value, the asset should fall by forty
percent.
The consequence of this type of adjustment means that the Armey flat
tax does not impose its lump sum tax on holders of debt, who pay no
tax on either return of principal or interest on old capital. The burden
of the debtors is, however, shifted to owners of equity. If all individuals
held equal portions of debt and equity, this effect would not matter, but
since there are varying portfolios, the tax would impose higher tax
burdens on consumption.
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TABLE 7: COMPONENTS OF EFFECTIVE TAX RATES, REPLACING INCOME
AND ESTATE TAXES WITH A FLAT TAX, BY INCOME CLASS

Income
Class ($
thousands)

Wage
Tax
20.8
Rate
(%)

Fringe
Benefits
Tax,
20.8
Rate
(%)

Business
Cash
Flow
Tax,
20.8
Rate

Wage
Tax 17
Rate
(%)

Fringe
Benefits
Tax,
17 Rate
(%)

Business
Cash
Flow
Tax,
17 Rate
(%)

(%)

0 - 10

1.3

1.8

0.4

10 - 20

1.9

1.7

1.2

20 - 30

3.5

2.2

30 - 50

5.4

50 - 75

1.8

1.4

0.3

3.8

1.4

0.9

1.5

5.8

1.8

1.2

2.3

1.8

7.6

1.9

1.5

7.1

2.2

1.9

8.9

1.8

1:5

75 - 100

8.6

2.1

1.9

9.8

1.7

1.5

100 -200

10.1

1.6

2.5

10.2

1.3

2.0

200 +

8.4

0.4

5.1

7.3

0.4

4.2

Total

7.5

1.7

2.6

8.3

1.4

2.1

SOURCE: DERIVED FROM.TREASURY DEPARTMENT (1996) DATA.
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VI.

MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF SHIFTING TO A
CONSUMPTION BASE

We discuss this issue in two steps. The first is how the distributional
tables for the flat tax would change if distributed according to consumption rather than income. This issue concerns the non-labor compensation
portion of the business cash flow tax: The tax on the difference between
earnings of capital and investment. The second issue is how to interpret
the heterogeneity in age that is reflected within classes and across
income classes, and whether a lifetime income framework is more
appropriate.

A.

Adjusting for Distribution by Consumption

Fortunately, the Treasury analysis disaggregates the tax into the three
separate components: The individual wage tax, the firm's tax on fringe
benefits and payroll tax, and the business cash flow tax. These
components are shown by income class in Table 7 (preceding page).
Table 7 indicates that the business cash flow tax (columns 4 and 5),
when allocated by income, is less important at the lower income levels,
and more important at higher income levels.
There are reasons to believe that this allocation is concentrated too
heavily in the lower income brackets, but also too heavily in the highest
income brackets, while middle income brackets receive too light a share.
First, the capital income tax is allocated to all capital, physical and
financial, including interest on government bonds, while the tax under
the flat tax applies only to business physical assets (indirectly in the case
of the stock market and corporations). Lower-income individuals,
however, tend to have only a very small part of assets in this form-for
personal incomes below $25,000, less than ten percent. For the highest
income classes (above $100,000), housing, which is the major excluded
physical asset, constituted between fifteen and thirty-four percent,
leaving between sixty-seven and eighty-five percent in the taxed
group.21

21. This calculation is based on numbers in Arthur B. Kennickell & Martha StarrMcCluer, Changes in Family Finances from 1989 to 1992: Evidence from the Survey
of Consumer Finances, 80 FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN 861 (1994). It is only an
approximation because while net worth is provided as a median and a mean, net worth
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This effect causes too much of capital subjected to the lump-sum tax
to be allocated to the lower income classes and too little to the higher
income classes. To illustrate, if we assume that housing constitutes
ninety percent of net assets in the lower income groups and fifteen
percent of net assets in the higher income groups, constituting thirty
percent overall, the effect of allocating the tax to all capital rather than
business capital would be to reduce the burden in the lower income
classes by eighty-five percent and raise it in the higher classes by
twenty-one percent.22 This change in allocation would add about one
percentage point to the tax rate in the top bracket, lower the bottom
bracket rates by almost 0.4 percentage points, and lower the second
bracket rate by one percentage point.
The second correction is needed because the overall savings rate in the
economy, which affects the overall amount of tax to allocate (since the

of each type is provided only as a median for those who hold it, making the overall
amount for the group (median assets multiplied by fraction holding the asset) somewhere
between a mean and a median. Since only a very small fraction of the lower income
groups held the asset, it was calculated as a fraction of mean assets rather than median
assets. It would be a larger fraction of median assets, but, of course, the median asset
of this type for all individuals would be zero. For the highest income group, the share
was calculated using both median and mean. For the intermediate groups, $25,00 to
$50,000 and $50,000 to $100,000, the range in share associated with housing was 34%
to 90% and 34% to 70%. Of course, mean and median wealth may be larger or smaller
than physical assets plus corporate stocks depending on whether or not net interestbearing assets are positive or negative. The trend, however, seems clear-housing is a
decreasing share of net assets as income rises.
22. These effects can be illustrated by the following simple relationships, in which
we assume there is included capital (businesses assets, denoted K) and excluded capital,
denoted E. There is a high and a low income class, denoted by h and l subscripts.
If g is the growth rate of the capital stock and R is the rate of return, t is the tax rate,
and we divided capital into taxable capital stock as K1 and Kh, with excluded capital E1
and Eh, allocating by total capital would result in the following burdens assigned to each
class:
Low Income: t(R-g)(K1 +K,J[(K1 + EJl(Kh + Eh +K1 +HJ]
High Income: t(R-g)(K1 +K,J[(Kh + E,Jl(Kh + Eh +K1 +HJ]
This shows that the tax t(R-g)(K1 +K,J would be divided based on the aggregate
holdings of capital. But the true allocation should be:
Low Income: t(R-g,JK1
High Income: t(R-g,JK,,
which allows for different holdings of capital.
By substituting in these equations for the fact that overall taxed capital represents
about 70% of the total capital stock, and assuming that the share that is taxed of total
capital holdings is 10% in the lower group (so that total holdings are ten times taxable
holdings), we can write the actual allocations as:
. Low Income: t(R-g,J(7)(10)K1
High Income: t(R-g,J( 7) (1/.85)K,,
As a result, the burden assigned to the lower group, for example, ignoring the
differences in g's, or savings rates, is seven times too large, or should be reduced by
85%.
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tax is imposed on profits minus savings), will vary across the income
classes. Using class-specific savings rates would alter tax rates in the
opposite direction from the change described in the previous paragraph,
since the savings rate is larger in the higher brackets.23 Thus, it would
lower the tax burden in the highest brackets, and increase it in lower
brackets.
Statistics published by the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT)24
provide some background to indicate this effect of savings hyterogeneity
on the distribution of a consumption tax. The JCT examined a five
percent consumption tax, but we have multiplied their numbers to create
a :fifteen percent rate, to make their tax similar in magnitude.
The JCT presents four variations on the distribution, which are
shown in Table 8 (following page). Two of the variations are relevant
to the flat tax. In one distribution, they allocated the benefit of
deducting savings at the time savings occurs, which is consistent with
distributing the tax based on consumption.25 This distribution is shown
in the third column. They also allocated the benefit of deducting savings
to the accrual of earnings on the savings, which would be very small
relative to savings. This allocation is close to the income allocation used
by the Treasury, except that it is as if savings is virtually zero (second
column). The aggregate tax would therefore be larger. The JCT also
provided two types of price assumptions: One where there is no rise in
prices, and one with a rise in prices. The one with no rise in prices
(second and third columns) is relevant to the flat tax.
The income classes used by the JCT are not comparable to those in
the Treasury tables used in assessing the flat tax, because they are not
as broadly defined. Thus, a $100,000 income in the JCT table (Table 8)
would be a significantly larger income in the Treasury's tables.
Nevertheless, they provide a rough guide to assessing how the distribution would be affected by savings rates.
23.

In terms of the mathematical formula in previous footnote, g,. is higher than

g, so that (R-g,J is smaller than (R-g). The opposite effect occurs for the lower income

class.
24.

JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS., METHODOLOGY AND
ISSUES IN MEASURING CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE TAX BURDENS 54-58
(Comm. Print 1993). Their tax was assumed to be an add-on tax so that it allowed an

offset for lower income taxes due to the deduction of these taxes from the base; the
numbers were corrected for this factor.
25. The tax was still restricted to the physical assets that are also taxed under the
flat tax.
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TABLE

8: EFFECTIVE TAX RATES, 15% CONSUMPTION TAX

Expanded
Income
Class
($thousands)

Income Base,
No Price
Accommodation

Consumption
Base, No
Price
Accommodation

0-IO

9.5

9.5

12.4

12.4

10-20

9.7

9.6

9.1

9.1

20-30

11.2

10.8

10.8

10.5

30-40

11.9

11.3

11.3

l0.8

40-50

12.4

11.8

11.8

11.2

50-75

12.4

11.5

11.5

l0.7

75-100

12.0

10.9

11.5

10.5

100-200

11.3

10.0

11.0

9.7

200+

12.3

7.6

11.9

7.6

Income Base,
Price
Accommodation

Consumption
Base, Price
Accommodation

SOURCE: DERIVED FROM JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION (1993) DATA.
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Note first that there is virtually no difference in the burdens in the
lower two classes, which would be consistent either with a virtually zero
savings rate or with very little existing capital ownership. Examining
the first two columns, however, we see that going from an income base
to a consumption base has a very big effect at the highest income level,
more modest effects in the upper middle income classes, and little effect
at the moderate income levels.
Although we note that the measurement of income is different in this
table, as an illustration, if we used this data to adjust for the top income
class in the flat tax distributional tables, the tax rate is actually three
percentage points too high; the adjustment for a higher savings rate is
much more important than the adjustment for the type of capital
ownership. 26
Thus, the corrections to the flat tax distribution tables would result in
a less progressive tax using a consumption basis. Tax burdens at the
lower end would not be much affected, but tax burdens in the upper
middle part of the distribution could rise, while burdens at high income
levels could fall. The effective tax burden for the flat tax at the highest
level in Table 1 would fall from fourteen percent to eleven percent.
Table 8 also indicates how a flat tax without an exemption under a
VAT or retail sales tax might look (last column), since those taxes
would need to be accommodated with a price change. These taxes tend
to be more regressive in general than a flat tax even without an
exemption, because the price level increase causes a loss in purchasing
power from unindexed transfer, raising the tax burden in the lower
income levels. 27

26. We would need to make two corrections. First, we would need to treat the
growth rate g in the aggregate as virtually zero. If the rate of return is 8% and the
growth rate is 2.5% (so that R-g is 5.5%) we need to increase the capital tax portion of
the tax burden, add it to the other components, which add up to 8.8%, and then decrease
the overall rate by the ratios shown in the bottom row, second and third columns of
Table 8, to derive a tax rate of 10.9% {[8.8+(5.1)(1.21)(8)/5.5])7.6/12.3}, rather than
14%.
27.

It is difficult to draw conclusions about the rest of the income distribution,
because the price rise also affected the income tax rates through indexing provisions and
the data were not available to correct for that effect. That may be one reason that the
rates do not rise in the moderate income classes, since they would be most affected by
the indexing procedures.
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B.

Distribution Across Generations and the Lifetime Perspective

It is important to recognize, however, that even though these cash flow
calculations indicate a certain distributional pattern, they are incomplete,
and possibly even misleading, in the higher income levels, where the
lump-sum tax on old capital and the deduction for savings are important.
.Within each income class, there is age heterogeneity, with some young
individuals who are accumulating lifetime savings, and some older
individuals who may be saving less or dissaving. In addition, because
income over the lifetime goes up and then down, a given individual may
be in different income classes over time. These observations mean that
calculating taxes paid in broad income aggregates using a single crosssection observation is incomplete.
For example, taxes imposed on the difference between earnings on
capital and savings are simultaneously imposing large taxes on older
individuals who are dissaving and providing benefits for young savers.
Of course, the young savers will eventually have to repay their deduction
over time, so that if one were looking only at young people, or people
in the steady-state long run, distributional effects might more easily be
seen by the wage tax portions, shown in Table 9 (following page). In
this case, the tax would still show a hump shape, with the highest taxes
applying to the higher middle-income groups, where the advantage of the
exclusion is decreasing but 'incomes are not high enough to have a large
fraction of income derived from capital income. Compared to current
taxes, with the 20.8 percent rate, the bottom sixty percent of the
population would still have a tax increase, the next higher thirty percent
would remain about even, and the top ten percent would have a
reduction. This outcome is contrasted with a tax increase for all but the
top ten percent when allocated by income.
In the highest income classes, the reduction would be dramatic-burdens would fall by fifty percent. Although this type of calculation is imprecise, it shows the significant benefits for young individuals
of effectively exempting capital income from tax during their lifetimes.
This benefit for younger generations in the higher income classes is,
of course, paid for by lump-sum _taxes on the older generations. Thus,
in a traditional life-cycle model, the largest tax burdens fall on the highincome elderly, and the largest benefits on the high-income young.
Relative to income, older individuals could be paying taxes many times
larger than their income, depending on how quickly they are dissaving.
That is, an older individual who is maintaining capital will pay a tax at
the statutory rate, while an older individual who finances half of
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TABLE 9: EFFECTIVE TAX RATES, LONG RUN BURDEN MEASURED BY
TOTAL AND BY WAGE PORTION OF FLAT TAX, BY INCOME CLASS

Income Class
($ thousands)

Current
Law(%)

With
Flat
Tax,
20.8%

With
Wage
Portion
of Flat
Tax
20.8%

With
Flat
Tax,
17%

With
Wage
Portion
of Flat
Tax 17%

0 - 10

8.1

13.8

13.3

13.9

13.5

10 - 20

8.8

15.0

13.8

16.5

14.1

20 - 30

13.4

17.6

16.1

19.3

18.1

30 - 50

17.3

19.6

17.8

21.5

20.0

50 - 75

19.8

21.8

19.7

23.0

21.5

75 - 100

21.2

23.4

21.7

23.4

21.9

100 - 200

21.9

23.0

20.5

21.9

19.9

200 +

23.6

17.0

11.9

14.9

10.7

Total

20.8

21.2

18.2

21.2

19.1

SOURCE: DERIVED FROM TREASURY DEPARTMENT (1996) DATA.
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consumption out of earnings and half out of savings will pay twice the
statutory rate.
This relationship could, however, be influenced by bequests, about
which we know very little. For wealthy families that pass on wealth
from one generation to another, older individuals could respond by
reducing their bequests to maintain consumption. In that case, the lumpsum tax on the old would be passed on to their descendants in the form
of a one-time decrease in asset values. Indeed, these individuals could
still pass on actual assets, such as physical property and shares of stock,
and the burden would fall on future generations, because these assets are
still bearing tax and have fallen in value.
These are some of the problems that confront this type of analysis.
Perhaps the clearest statement that might be made about this
distributional effect is that lower and moderate-income individuals- are
likely to pay higher taxes under these proposals, and the very wealthy
as a group are likely to benefit from the ability to accumulate future
wealth without taxation.
·
C.

Asset Price Effects: Behavioral Responses and Transition Relief

Some of the effects discussed in the previous section could be altered
by other factors. Two of these factors have to do with asset price effects
deriving from reallocation of capital and transition relief.
While consumption taxes impose lump-sum taxes on business capital,
they also remove the preferences that favor owner-occupied housing over
business capital. They may also be inducing increased savings, and may
also affect the choice between debt and equity finance, which will in
tum influence rates of return. These behavioral responses will have
effects on the distribution of the tax burden across income classes, and
perhaps even across time.
Much attention has been focused on the possible depression in prices
of houses due to the removal of tax benefits that favor these assets. The
mortgage interest and property tax deductions are often mentioned, but
economic assessments of. these asset price effects also consider the
increased rate of return in equity investments in business assets as well.
Some studies have claimed very large depressing effects on asset
prices. 28 Of course, there should be an offsetting asset price increase
in business assets, and thus, in the stock market.
It is important to recognize the difference in the nature of these asset
price effects. They are not fundamental to the nature of the tax, as is the
28. These studies are reviewed in Jane G. Gravelle, The Flat Tax and Other
Proposals: Effects on Housing, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. No. 96-379 (Apr. 29, 1996).
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lump-sum tax on old capital (which may express itself as an asset price
effect). Rather they derive from behavioral responses, including the
ability of the economy to expand or contract the supply of assets. If the
quantity of assets could be quickly altered to suit new preferences, then
there would be no asset price effects. Thus, any asset price effects are
transitory.
It is not easy to determine how powerful these asset price effects
would be in the short run, or how they would affect the distribution.
There are reasons to expect that they would be modest in the short run,
as any small change in asset prices may cause individuals who own
assets to respond in a way that would dampen the effects; moreover,
historical evidence does not support large swings in the prices of
housing. 29 In addition, although lower-income individuals tend to own
more housing relative to other assets, the downward pressures on
housing will occur at the higher end, for a number of reasons. Indeed,
it is possible for the total demand for housing to contract, but the
demand for smaller units to expand. Thus, the distributional effects
discussed in this Article are unlikely to be heavily affected by asset price
adjustments due to shifts between housing and other assets.
There may be more relevant effects if the savings rate increases
(increasing the demand for business assets and driving up their prices),
or, if there are portfolio shifts between debt and equity assets, also
driving up the demand for business property and corporate stock. Any
asset price effects would be temporary, but they would moderate the
lump-sum effects of the tax on the oldest individuals who are selling
capital goods in the short run. It is extremely difficult to determine
whether this effect would be important.
A second phenomenon that could alter the distributions is the adoption
of transition relief. If transition relief is allowed in the form of allowing
the recovery of basis (such as depreciation and inventories), then the
sellers of assets will receive considerable relief. These benefits would
not entirely offset the initial asset tax, unless the deductions allowed
were immediate, but their present value could provide a substantial asset
price offset. Their benefits would vary across assets, depending on the
remaining basis relative to market value and the speed of recovery
allowed.

29.

See id.
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Transition relief would not, however, have a permanent effect on
asset prices. As depreciation and inventory recovery is used up, asset
prices would fall to the level that would have occurred without transition
relief. Individuals who purchase stocks, for example, will be purchasing
two assets--the stock itself at its permanent lower price, and a stream
of remaining tax deductions.
Transition relief would also require higher tax rates to make up the
revenue. For that reason, transition relief shifts the burden from initial
old generations to intermediate generations, while not affecting the long
run steady-state. An alternative way to provide complete relief for the
lump sum tax on old capital is to adopt a wage tax: A wage tax will
increase the tax burden of future generations relative to a consumption
tax, because a permanently higher tax rate will be required.

D.

The USA Tax

The USA proposal is in many ways more complicated than the other
proposals. It contains both a modified VAT and a direct consumption
tax, so that financial as well as physical assets are subject to tax. It has
graduated rates and is designed to be distributionally neutral across
incomes. It contains transition rules that reduce the burden on old
capital and shift burdens across generations. And there are a variety of
exceptions from the broad-based consumption tax approach (for example,
mortgage interest deductions are still allowed, and a certain amount of
asset sales and loan proceeds can be excluded) which alter the nature of
the tax. Taken as a whole, these provisions are likely to make the
differences between the current tax and the USA tax smaller than is the
case with the other taxes.

E.

Income Tax Reform

Although a proposal for income tax reform has been made, no details
have been provided. It is easier to structure an income tax reform so
that the distributional consequences can be more easily understood,
although even when distributional neutrality is attempted, there will be
shifts in burden within income classes.
CONCLUSION

The concern about distributional consequences of major tax reform
proposals is well founded. The analysis in this Article suggests that
there will be substantial redistribution across income classes and across
generations in the middle- and upper-income classes. Even without
considering the consequences of a switch to a new tax base, flat or
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single-rate taxes tend to shift the tax burden dramatically from highincome individuals to lower- and middle-income individuals, and
significantly alter the distribution of after-tax income.
These
distributional effects are even more pronounced when changes in the tax
base occur. Under the flat tax, tax burdens for future high-income
classes could fall by half, and lifetime disposable income would increase
substantially.
Moreover, there is an enormous amount of uncertainty associated with
the projected effects. Until we learn a great deal more about life-cycle
savings and the accumulation of capital, including the role of bequests,
much of our analysis of tax burdens across the generations will be
guesswork. The difficulty facing fundamental tax reform is that we will
obtain a major redistribution of the tax burden which we cannot chart
with any degree of certainty.
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